Defusing Democracy Central Bank Autonomy And The Transition From Authoritarian Rule

Defusing Democracy  Central Bank Autonomy and the Transition from Authoritarian Rule PDF
Author: Delia Margaret Boylan
Publisher:
ISBN:
Size: 57.97 MB
Format: PDF, Mobi
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 734
View: 348

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Defusing Democracy Central Bank Autonomy And The Transition From Authoritarian Rule

by Delia Margaret Boylan, Defusing Democracy Central Bank Autonomy And The Transition From Authoritarian Rule Books available in PDF, EPUB, Mobi Format. Download Defusing Democracy Central Bank Autonomy And The Transition From Authoritarian Rule books,


Defusing Democracy

Defusing Democracy PDF
Author: Delia M. Boylan
Publisher: University of Michigan Press
ISBN: 9780472112142
Size: 22.89 MB
Format: PDF
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 295
View: 4685

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Defusing Democracy

by Delia M. Boylan, Defusing Democracy Books available in PDF, EPUB, Mobi Format. Download Defusing Democracy books, DIVA substantive focus on transitions to democracy combined with an analytical approach rooted in the political economy of institutions /div


Unelected Power

Unelected Power PDF
Author: Paul Tucker
Publisher: Princeton University Press
ISBN: 0691176736
Size: 30.46 MB
Format: PDF, ePub
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 656
View: 3330

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Unelected Power

by Paul Tucker, Unelected Power Books available in PDF, EPUB, Mobi Format. Download Unelected Power books, Guiding principles for ensuring that central bankers and other unelected policymakers remain stewards of the common good Central bankers have emerged from the financial crisis as the third great pillar of unelected power alongside the judiciary and the military. They pull the regulatory and financial levers of our economic well-being, yet unlike democratically elected leaders, their power does not come directly from the people. Unelected Power lays out the principles needed to ensure that central bankers, technocrats, regulators, and other agents of the administrative state remain stewards of the common good and do not become overmighty citizens. Paul Tucker draws on a wealth of personal experience from his many years in domestic and international policymaking to tackle the big issues raised by unelected power, and enriches his discussion with examples from the United States, Britain, France, Germany, and the European Union. Blending economics, political theory, and public law, Tucker explores the necessary conditions for delegated but politically insulated power to be legitimate in the eyes of constitutional democracy and the rule of law. He explains why the solution must fit with how real-world government is structured, and why technocrats and their political overseers need incentives to make the system work as intended. Tucker explains how the regulatory state need not be a fourth branch of government free to steer by its own lights, and how central bankers can emulate the best of judicial self-restraint and become models of dispersed power. Like it or not, unelected power has become a hallmark of modern government. This critically important book shows how to harness it to the people's purposes.


The Political Foundations Of Judicial Independence

The Political Foundations of Judicial Independence PDF
Author: Brad Epperly
Publisher: Oxford University Press, USA
ISBN: 0198845022
Size: 35.92 MB
Format: PDF, Kindle
Category : Political Science
Languages : en
Pages : 224
View: 6545

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The Political Foundations Of Judicial Independence

by Brad Epperly, The Political Foundations Of Judicial Independence Books available in PDF, EPUB, Mobi Format. Download The Political Foundations Of Judicial Independence books, This book argues that explaining judicial independence-considered the fundamental question of comparative law and politics-requires a perspective that spans the democracy/autocracy divide. Rather than seeking separate explanations in each regime context, in The Political Foundations of Judicial Independence in Dictatorship and Democracy, Brad Epperly argues that political competition is a salient factor in determining levels of de facto judicial independence across regime type, and in autocracies a factor of far greater import. This is because a full "insurance" account of independence requires looking not only at the likelihood those in power might lose elections but also the variable risks associated with such an outcome, risks that are far higher for autocrats. First demonstrating that courts can and do provide insurance to former leaders, he then shows via exhaustive cross-national analyses that competition's effects are far higher in autocratic regimes, providing the first evidence for the causal nature of the relationship. Epperly argues that these findings differ from existing case study research because in democratic regimes, a lack of political competition means incumbents target the de jure independence of courts. This argument is illustrated via in-depth case study of the Hungarian Constitutional Court after the country's 2010 "constitutional coup," and then tested globally. Blending formal theory, observational and instrumental variables models, and elite interviews of leading Hungarian legal scholars and judges, Epperly offers a new framework for understanding judicial independence that integrates explanations of both de jure and de facto independence in both democratic and autocratic regimes.


Public Governance Of Central Banks

Public Governance of Central Banks PDF
Author: Yoshiharu Oritani
Publisher:
ISBN:
Size: 59.99 MB
Format: PDF, ePub, Docs
Category : Banks and banking, Central
Languages : en
Pages : 45
View: 4653

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Public Governance Of Central Banks

by Yoshiharu Oritani, Public Governance Of Central Banks Books available in PDF, EPUB, Mobi Format. Download Public Governance Of Central Banks books, The governance of central banks has two dimensions: corporate governance and public governance. Public governance is an institutional framework whereby the general public governs a central bank by and through the legislative and executive bodies in a country. This paper argues that the literature of new institutional economics sheds new light on the public governance of central banks. First, Williamson's theory of 'governance as integrity' (probity) is applied to the internal management of central banks. Moe's theory of 'public bureaucracy' is applied to the concept of central bank independence. Second, we apply agency theory to the issues associated with central bank independence and accountability. Third, public choice theory is applied to central bank independence.


Annual Review Of Political Science

Annual review of political science PDF
Author: Annual Reviews, inc
Publisher: Annual Reviews
ISBN:
Size: 20.66 MB
Format: PDF, Mobi
Category : Political science
Languages : en
Pages : 516
View: 1705

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Annual Review Of Political Science

by Annual Reviews, inc, Annual Review Of Political Science Books available in PDF, EPUB, Mobi Format. Download Annual Review Of Political Science books,